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awareness on the nature of terrorists, researched potential tactics and tools, and 
examined existing assumptions about maritime security.  In applying the red 
team concept, the case study used military officers as surrogate terrorists 
planning a campaign to attack port cities. The case study effectively 
demonstrated the anticipated functions, while the follow-on actions ensured that 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
How do we conduct a war versus a strategy as nebulous as terrorism?  
This question plagues the leaders of the United States, and since September 11, 
2001, every city and government agency across the country. (Feith, 2004)   From 
city officials to the President of the United States (U.S.), not only the 
responsibility to respond to a terrorist attack, but also the responsibility to prevent 
any future attacks has spread to every person concerned.  Additionally, that 
fateful day proves that as a force, as a nation, the United States continuously 
needs to expand her repertoire in the art of war.  The U.S. needs to employ the 
full spectrum of warfare in order to counter the threat of terrorism.  At times, this 
will require preemptive action, and at others, it will require careful diplomacy, but 
in order to make these options and others more effective, it is necessary to 
understand the adversary we face.  The necessity to dissect the decision-making 
process of an adversary is not new, but the adversary we face certainly is new to 
many.  In so many ways, the methods of terrorist organizations are vague and 
hazy to the Western method of rational thinking.  Some experts doubt that the 
ability exists in Western capitalists and Islamic fundamentalists to understand 
each other.   
Security and risk assessment professionals must always adapt 
proactive measures to anticipate, defend against, and preempt new 
types of terrorist attacks.  Moreover, one should not expect past 
trends to necessarily reveal future attack patterns because 
terrorists, especially al-Qaeda planners always seek to exploit new 
vulnerabilities and new and innovative modes of warfare in order to 
evade detection and inflict maximum damage. (Sinai, 2003)   
As researchers and military members, we have a responsibility to assist the 
efforts of these leaders and units as they engage this particular new type of 





Practitioners of strategy and force planning constantly struggle to 
achieve a balance among many competing variables. The art of 
strategy and force planning is made evident by how well the 
inevitable tensions among these variables are resolved. (Bartlett, 
Holman, & Somes, 2000)  
Using the Bartlett Model seen in Figure 1, the continuous and iterative 
nature of strategy and force planning is apparent.  Divergent views of the current 
threats and vulnerabilities shape the debates on the national goals, strategies 
and means.  Consequently, the assessment of the security environment requires 
strategists to examine the adversary and his strategic development.   In this 
case, do terrorist organizations function similarly to states or businesses? Do 
they balance their goals and objectives with the risks and resources? Is it 
possible to influence or predict this process with our actions and reactions? 
Furthermore, are our forces prepared and capable to counter the threat of this 
new adversary?  With resource constraints constantly limiting involvement, each 
choice represents a risk.   In order to mitigate the level of risk in these choices, it 
is necessary to maintain the iterative nature, reassessing the security 
environment in light of the national goals and capabilities.   
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate one method of risk mitigation, the 
red team concept, and its effectiveness in revealing and examining the inherent 
assumptions of the enterprise that employs it.  By applying the red team concept 
to domestic port security, the case study aims to identify the maritime 
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack at three large Western cities. In addition, the red 
teams will evaluate the tools and tactics employed by terrorists to avoid detection 
while planning a terrorist attack.  However, in any evaluation on the effectiveness 
of the concept, we must also consider the utility of the knowledge and the actions 
taken based on that knowledge.  Therefore, this thesis will explore the red team 
concept and its applicability to counterterrorism and maritime security.    
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Figure 1: Bartlett Model of Strategic Development (Bartlett et al, 2000) 
 
C. RELATED WORK 
Other research relevant to this thesis involves two specific topics: counter-
terrorism and the red team concept.  There are countless experiments, debates, 
and projects pursuing the topic of terrorism and its subordinate fields. In addition, 
there are many experiments and research on the effectiveness of models, 
simulations and games. However, there are few efforts to research the 
effectiveness of models, simulations, and games in counter-terrorism.  Yet, more 
enterprises are utilizing field exercises and war games to test their security 
measures and emergency responders in a terrorist attack.  Consequently, 
research is necessary to examine the success of these exercises and improve 
their efforts.   
We believe red teaming is especially important now. Adversaries 
are tough targets for intelligence. Red teaming can both 
complement and inform intelligence collection and analysis. 











order to discover weaknesses before real adversaries do. Red 
teaming also tempers the complacency that often follows success. 
(DSB, 2003)   
With these words, the Defense Science Board (DSB) tasked the Defense 
Adaptive Red Team (DART) to examine the red team concept in depth. Hicks & 
Associates, Inc., is the prime contractor for the DART and relies on “an extensive 
network of experts in terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, technology 
exploitation, cultural intelligence, media influence operations, information and 
communication systems attack, urban operations and war-gaming” in order to 
establish and disseminate best practices for conducting red-teaming throughout 
government agencies. (H&AI, 2004) However, at the beginning of this case 
study, DART had not yet published the findings from the Center for Adaptive 
Strategies and Threats (CAST) at H&AI.  As of the conclusion of this thesis, only 
working papers were available.  These papers discussed the future of Al Qa’ida, 
the historical use of red teams in the military and initial recommendations for red 
team usage.  
Other organizations are using the red team concept specifically to counter 
terrorist efforts. Sandia National Laboratories is currently using red teams to 
identify potential terrorist attack methods and profiles in order to provide 
indicators and increase the quality of warnings from intelligence centers.  
However, the majority of their efforts focus on cyber warfare aspects rather than 
direct action or psychological operations.  Joshua Sinai in coordination with the 
Red Team Journal has written articles discussing the uses of the red team to 
examine national strategies and assess emerging threats in the security 
environment.  Additionally, cities such as Seattle and Salt Lake City, conduct 
annual exercises that include red teams to examine their security and emergency 
response systems.  However, none of these efforts directly examines the 
effectiveness of using red teams to identify potential vulnerabilities to terrorist 
attack.   
Therefore, in this case study, we attempt to utilize the red team concept in 
order to address this deficit, and if possible, to identify the critical elements and 
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the measures of effectiveness of the red team concept to ensure future 
successful applications.  By building on the recommendation from DSB, we hope 
to complement the efforts of Sandia and the regional homeland security experts 
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II. RED TEAM CONCEPT 
A. HISTORY AND DEFINITIONS 
One of the principles of war as stated by Sun Tzu is “determine the 
enemy’s plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will 
not.”(Sun Tzu, 1963)  The attempt to determine the intentions of an adversary is 
an age-old idea.  By considering how the enemy plans to attack, one can learn 
the best way to counter the attack and increase the likelihood of success.  The 
United States has been using simulations, games and models since its inception, 
and especially in the last century, to address potential threats and strategies.  
Specifically, the United States Navy “established a strong gaming tradition 
between the world wars and carried these traditions forward into the age of high-
tech gaming after World War II.” (Perla, 1990)  After World War II, the United 
States routinely used games and simulations to address broad national security 
issues. (Hanley, 1991)  Mostly due to the expense, the use of models, 
simulations, and games is preferred to field exercises in order to train leaders 
and research operational methods. (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  This led to 
machine-directed games to test and develop tactics and strategies.  Furthermore, 
there are massive multi-player gaming capabilities throughout the Department of 
Defense (DOD) that require multiple processors with the highest processing 
speeds and the largest databases. Yet, verbal scenarios and seminar games, 
also known as free-form games, are more popular to address the broader 
strategic and allocation issues.  
The political and military free-form [model, simulation, & game] was 
designed primarily as a method of investigating substantive 
questions in political science rather than as a gaming methodology. 
Such games are usually played with a red team, a blue team, and 
control team. (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)   
Even though our version of the red team for this case study is vastly different, the 
history of these attempts in war games and exercises has shaped our current red 
team concept and principles. 
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Although many may know what we mean by the term ‘red team,’ the 
definition we use in this thesis comes from the DSB Task Force on DOD Red 
Teaming Activities: “We define red teams broadly, including, not only playing the 
adversary, but also playing devil’s advocate and related roles.”(DSB, 2003)  The 
purpose of the red team is to reduce risks and increase opportunities by 
challenging aspects of plans, programs, and assumptions.  The shapes and 
sizes of red teams in past and current organizations vary widely.  DSB further 
breaks the definition down into three specific types: surrogate adversaries and 
competitors, devil’s advocates, and independent sources of judgment.  
Furthermore, when acting as surrogate adversaries, the red team tries to emulate 
the enemy, using his presumed tactics and weapons. (DSB, 2003)  In this study, 
the red teams act as surrogate adversaries outside the usual exercise construct.   
In particular, due to the objectives of counterterrorism and homeland security, 
there is no specific blue team interacting with the red team – instead the red 
teams challenge the real agencies and personnel of the targets. The discussion 
of the case study will explain the structure in more detail (Chapter 6).  
 
B. PAST AND CURRENT RED-TEAMING ACTIVITIES 
In the United States, the history of war games, and, by extension – their 
red teams, is the most developed within the DOD.  One of the best-remembered 
war games is the Strategy and Force Evaluation (SAFE) hosted by the Rand 
Corporation in the 1960s. It was an extremely well documented formal seminar 
with two teams consisting of highly trained and experienced strategic analysts.  
Rand provided both teams with a budget, a policy statement to guide decisions, a 
selection of available strategic forces, the current force postures of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and the task of designing the future shape of the 
armed forces. The most important results of the SAFE games were the branch 
points (discarded courses of action) that inspired focused seminars to examine 
the consequences of strategy selection or rejection. (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)   
The Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA) of the Pentagon was vital 
because “the hypothetical crises [were] treated intensively, and the game 
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environment serve[d] the important additional purposes of stimulating 
communication among agencies and assessment of personnel in a real-world 
environment.” (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  One of the most celebrated and 
continual use of red teams is by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, especially 
because, from 1991-2001, 37 of the 81 exercises conducted resulted in 
successful attacks against the targeted plant. In those exercises, the 
Commission created a permanent staff of red team members to act as surrogate 
adversaries and probe for security discrepancies. (Eckert, 2004)   
Current red-teaming activities within the DOD vary in their objectives, their 
structures, and their perspectives. The U.S. Navy SSBN Security Program, 
acting as devil’s advocates, assesses threats and vulnerabilities based on 
technological feasibility and operational realities. Their focus has shifted over the 
years to include force protection measures, terrorist threats, and in-port security, 
but the scope of their assessments is the same. The Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) attempts to identify, characterize, understand and mitigate the risks 
associated with the development and deployment of systems through a threat-
based technological approach. Their Countermeasures Hands-On Program 
(CHOP) examines unsophisticated threats to these systems.  The Air Force Red 
Team designs and performs field tests to assess technological concepts. The 
Army Red Franchise, similarly to the SAFE games of the 1960s, is responsible 
for defining the operational environment for the next two decades, in order to 
shape the force and capability structure of the Army.  The Joint Forces 
Command Red Teams participate in joint exercises and experiments that usually 
preclude or constrain free-play in the scenario.  The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, designated the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assist in his 
force protection responsibilities by performing vulnerability assessments at DOD 
installations worldwide. (GAO, 2002)  Finally, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense tasked the DART with providing red-team concept development and an 
evaluation framework while providing the full spectrum of red teams to DOD 
units. (DSB, 2003)  
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Non-governmental agencies are also applying operational gaming to 
address city and regional planning, transportation and ecological studies, 
economic forecasting, and, especially, emergency preparedness. (Brewer & 
Shubik, 1979)  For example, Sandia National Laboratories is using red-teams to 
generate “specific hypothetical scenarios that can then be distilled into their 
component parts to deliver the desired operational methods.” Their new 
“Hypothesizer” would serve as a database of possible terrorist tactics and 
scenarios as developed by the red teams, allowing analysts to assess the 
likelihood of potential attacks depending on the intelligence. (Sandia, 2003)   
Overall, there has been resurgence in the use of red teams in the last 
decade, primarily because of the increased emphasis on force protection and 
critical infrastructure.  Yet, the majority of these red teams concentrates on the 
technological applications of tools and weapons or assesses compliance with 
listed and known vulnerabilities.  None truly attempt to discern new methods, 
applications, tools, and/or strategies of potential threat entities or attempt to 
evaluate the red team as a concept itself.  
 
C. KEY ELEMENTS TO SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
Although many institutions and scholars have attempted to define and 
describe the elements and process of models, games and simulations, very few 
have directed specific thought to the importance of the red team itself or as a 
concept.  In the compilation of research for related work, the nebulous nature of 
the red team and its elements became apparent.  Although there are various 
recommendations and examinations about war games and simulations, there 
remains no definitive guide on the use of the red team concept, especially as 
related to its application and effectiveness.  The red team concept has evolved in 
the last decade into standing and temporary groups dedicated to examining 
assumptions and risks of an enterprise and its plans.  Mostly seen in the context 
of computer network vulnerability assessments, these principles and elements 
are applicable to any system.  
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When applying the red team concept, it is necessary to recognize two 
types of critical elements that will help or hinder the red team; we have termed 
these situational and organizational. The situational elements are the result of 
either the scenario or the red-team itself: the selection of the exercise type; the 
initial conditions; the development of the scenario; the selection and training of 
the red team members; or the analysis and documentation of the results. In 
contrast, the organizational elements depend on the hosting enterprise: 
interaction with the blue team; the imposed constraints on the red team; 
interpretation of the results; distribution of the resulting information; and reception 
of the information.  
 
1.  Situational Elements 
Critical to the success of any model, game, or simulation is the stated 
objective.   There are many reasons to conduct an exercise such as education, 
technical or doctrinal evaluation, research, or planning. However, in order to 
evaluate its effectiveness or mark the team’s progress, the hosting enterprise 
must state the purpose(s) at the outset. (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  Once the 
enterprise delineates the objective, it must choose the structure of the 
experiment, activity, or exercise, which in turn determines the type of red team 
required.  The range of exercises varies from the truly manual free-form 
experiment to the automated simulation to the highly structured field exercise. 
Often the structure will depend on the desired purpose.  For example, the 
automated simulation and the field exercise are more often suited for technical 
evaluations and procedural training, respectively.  For doctrinal evaluations and 
strategic planning, the manual free-form experiment is more desirable.  
Once the objectives and the type of exercise have been determined, the 
development of the scenario becomes vital.  
Little is known about the impact of a particular scenario on game 
play and outcomes. Even less is known about what constitutes a 
“good” or “bad” scenario; the scientific investigation necessary to 
begin to sort these matters out has yet to be undertaken, in spite of 
the preponderance of bad scenarios. Successful scenarios and 
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scenario writers exhibit many of the characteristics of good 
historical accounts and good historians.(Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  
Developing the scenario should take as much time as necessary, and 
writers should base them on historical accounts and available doctrine to the 
highest extent possible.  The degree of realism in the scenario greatly influences 
the validity of the exercise.  
Contributing to the reality of the scenario is the quality of the red team 
itself.  The enterprise must staff each red team with personnel that have not only 
technical skills but also a vivid imagination, so that they do more than “play Red” 
but also “think Red”. (Perla, 1990) The surrogate must experience the 
adversary’s methods, motives, and limitations and, if possible, the operational 
environment. (Sandia, 2003)  Moreover, temporary or rotating red team members 
are preferred to a permanent staff in order to bring fresh perspectives to the 
issue.  As an experiment progresses, documentation becomes important to the 
evaluation of its results.  “No coherent standards exist to help the gamer with 
documentation; the matter is left very much up to the judgment of those 
conducting the game.” (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  The standards for 
documentation must be set along with the objectives in order to determine the 
measures of effectiveness.  Again, this is dependent upon the type of experiment 
conducted. The automated simulations have the possibility of being quantitative 
and objective while the experiments designed for research and planning are 
more often qualitative and subjective. (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  
 
2.  Organizational Elements 
We defined the following elements to be organizational factors largely 
because they vary with the host enterprise. It may be obvious to handle a 
strategic problem with a manual exercise, but there are numerous decisions 
about the structure of the teams and the exercise that can affect the resulting 
effectiveness. (Perla, 1990)  The level of interaction with a blue team is 
determined at the outset and is largely dependent upon the type of exercise and 
the objective.  The quality of interaction is even more important than the required 
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level.  The continuous progress of events in the exercise needs to reflect the 
actions and reactions of not only the blue team but also the red team. (Murray, 
2003)  If the red team’s interactions are intensely scripted vice freely played, then 
the red team’s training can be minimal.  However, if any free play is required, 
then the quality of the interaction will depend on the training and indoctrination of 
the red team members into the culture of the adversary.  “There is a delicate 
balance between creating a reasonable representation of opposing capabilities 
and doctrine and imposing an artificial constraint on the imagination and 
creativity of the players.” (Perla, 1990)  Realistic constraints on the red team’s 
potential decisions and actions become crucial to the validity of the exercise 
results.    
As previously stated, analysis and documentation is a critical situational 
element but the interpretation of these results can be an organizational factor.  
Although the major events will usually produce obvious results, often the minor 
details that led to the success or failure of the exercise will take time to compile 
into after-action reports.  After compilation, the interpretation of the degree of 
success or the lessons learned is dependent on the host enterprise. Even 
quantitative results may be interpreted subjectively depending on the desires and 
personalities in charge of the exercise.   
Much of the decision making that gaming supports is political in 
more ways than one. The most pervasive ‘dirty little secret’ of DoD 
gaming is that the games often are there to support decisions and 
conclusions already made. (Perla, 1990)   
Another aspect of interpretation is the distribution of the results to those 
concerned.  Sometimes, the host enterprise will classify results as proprietary or 
dangerous in order to hide the ineffectiveness of the tested system.  
Furthermore, some leaders and managers will discount the information if it does 
not reflect their views of the system or because it exposes fallacious 
assumptions. (Murray, 2003)  For these reasons, it is vital to establish the 
parameters of effectiveness prior to the conduct of the exercise.  By deciding the 
determining factors for success early, there can be no question or 
14 
misinterpretation of the results of the exercise. In addition, the information can 
help other units and agencies with similar questions by establishing not only the 
initial distribution but also the conditions for continued distribution at the outset of 
the exercise or experiment.  
 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Measures of effectiveness will always play a critical role in any 
organization that has to prioritize the allocation of its resources.  This is even 
truer for exercises and experiments conducted by these organizations.  As 
previously stated, the purpose of the red team concept is to reduce risks and 
increase opportunities by challenging aspects of plans, programs, and 
assumptions.  The risks and opportunities involved are critical to the allocation of 
resources, the formulation of strategies, and the development of plans.   
At its most basic, the evaluation boils down to deciding whether 
some idea or way of looking at the problem existed after the 
exercise that was not generally accepted before the game was 
played. (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  
Although it is easier to establish these parameters for quantitative results, the 
often qualitative and subjective data produced by the manual and free-play 
games can be complex.  The fact that the data is mostly non-scientific and not 
replicable leads many to believe that the analysis and documentation contain no 
tangible research results. In addition, too much unstructured documentation is 
inefficient to analyze or interpret. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the 
enterprise to identify “reasonable, interesting, and manageable units of 
observation and analysis.” (Brewer and Shubik, 1979) With either research or 
strategy as an objective, there are two potential approaches to examining the 
results of a manual free-play exercise: the decision-making approach and the 





1.  Decision-making Approach 
The manual, free-form game has great potential – though it is rarely 
used – as a way of examining branch points, that is, the logical 
development of courses considered seriously by one of the teams 
but not actually submitted as a formal move during gameplay. 
(Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  
The decision-making approach attempts to examine the logic behind the 
selected events of the red team.  The type and scope of decisions is as important 
as the reasons for selection.  Attempting to discern the elements of the 
adversary’s decision-making process can yield useful insights into methods of 
targeting, especially for information operations.  However, this aspect of the 
adversary is the most difficult to interpret.  The surrogate adversary, or red-team, 
truly needs to have an understanding of the enemy in order to deliver realistic 
insights into their decision-making process. Unlike the rational actor theory, most 
people do not make entirely rational decisions.  Personal biases, doctrine, 
ideology, and experiences can sway a cost-benefit analysis to a preferred course 
of action.  
 
2. Event Approach 
The event approach treats each event as specific evidence for a research 
interest.  Whether it is tactics, weapons employment, procedural ideas or branch 
points, these events can facilitate the exchange of information or create and 
challenge emerging operational concepts. Furthermore, the enterprise can 
formulate these events into “signatures such as data entries or intelligence 
reports.” (Sandia, 2003)  Although it is necessary to understand why the 
surrogate adversary chooses a specific event, the branch points can be as 
critical to understanding the adversarial viewpoint.  Additionally, the red team can 
conceptualize new tactics, weapons and tools, or procedures, affording 





E.  SUMMARY 
The red team concept can challenge assumptions, measure risks, and 
increase opportunities by capitalizing on an approach that can create new 
knowledge or examine the decision to employ this knowledge.  Yet, it requires 
careful application of the key situational and organizational elements in order to 
be effective.  The selection of the exercise type, the initial conditions, the 
development of the scenario, the selection and training of the red team members, 
and the analysis and documentation of the results will largely shape the “play” of 
the red team.  However, interaction with the blue team, the imposed constraints 
on the red team, interpretation of the results, distribution of the resulting 
information, and reception of the information can also alter any accomplishments 
and contributions of the red team.  Yet, organizations need this type of innovative 
method of examining private and public systems in order to conquer today’s 
challenges in the security environment.   
In addition to the need for appropriate analyses, several important 
substantive topics appear to have been overlooked by the 
operational gaming community – topics whose intractability to other 
analytic approaches is rivaled only by their importance for 
international affairs and national security.  In our opinion, most of 
these topics could be investigated, at least initially, by means of 
free-form manual gaming techniques… Terrorism, deception, and 
negotiation and bargaining strategies and tactics are equally 
appropriate topics. (Brewer & Shubik, 1979)   
Consequently, the red team concept is uniquely capable of addressing the topic 
of terrorism – especially the threat that it poses to domestic security issues. 
However, as seen in the next chapter, several aspects of terrorism pose a 
challenge to planners and strategists.  
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III. CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM 
A. TERRORIST WARFARE 
Predicting future trends in terrorism has always been next to 
impossible.  The actors involved have been few, their actions often 
erratic, and the behavior of small groups in society is no more 
predictable than that of very small particles in the physical world. 
(Laqueur, 2003)  
However, terrorists’ influence on our world is increasing.  In order to adapt 
our strategies to counter this threat, it is necessary to attempt to understand it.  It 
is important to remember that “[m]any terrorisms exist, and their character has 
changed over time and from country to country.  The endeavor to find a general 
theory of terrorism, one overall explanation of its roots, is a futile and misguided 
enterprise.” (Laqueur, 2003) Yet, in examining the history, principles and 
elements of terrorist warfare, certain trends become recognizable, trends that we 
can in turn influence with our actions. 
 
1.  History 
In the past, groups used terrorist warfare to extract political or financial 
concessions from governments and other organizations.  Although historians 
have noted incidents of terrorism as early as the Zealots-Sicarri of the first 
century B.C., modern terrorism began with the French Revolution, when 
Robespierre used tribunals to publicize the fate of the prisoners. (Cronin, 2002)  
In the nineteenth century, as political revolutions and reformation movements 
abounded throughout the globe, terrorism gained the new goal of dissolution of 
empires and new distribution of political power. However, this form of terrorism 
focused on the assassinations of heads of state and generals as symbolic targets 
for greater attention.  The transformation of terrorism towards national self-
determination began after World War I. Yet, the international character of 
terrorism developed after World War II, as states, such as Russia, Iran, Libya, 
and North Korea, covertly sponsored terrorist organizations. Terrorists began 
attacking targets outside their domestic region such as the 1972 Munich 
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Olympics massacre by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and then these 
terrorist organizations began to train each other in tactics and weapons 
employment.  During this phase, terrorists used plane hijackings, suicide 
bombings, and hostage taking in seemingly random attacks to gain attention for 
their cause and/or raise funds for their operations. By the late 1990s, there were 
four trends in modern terrorism: religiously motivated terrorists were more 
common; the number of people killed in individual attacks had increased (while 
the number of attacks had decreased); since 1968, terrorists targeted U.S. 
nationals more; and terrorists had dispersed their attacks throughout a larger 
region. (Cronin, 2002)   
The newest phase of terrorism, often referred to as the jihad era, is the 
result of the continued expansion of religiously motivated terrorist organizations. 
Although nationalist terrorists continue to operate around the world, the growing 
trend is towards religious extremists attacking Western targets.  Islamic terrorists 
operated domestically and regionally in Egypt and throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa since the 1920s; but as political and economic factors increased 
the level of Western involvement in the region, the aggression and violence 
turned towards the West and the symbols of its culture and economy.  In 1979, 
Iran called for an Islamic jihad across the Middle East, inspiring and supporting 
other organizations in the region to use terrorism to accomplish their objectives.  
A loose federation of Egyptian and Arab terrorist groups from the 1970s and 
1980s organized themselves and recruited others in order to fight the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. For these Arab Afghans, jihad was imminent; so Afghanistan and 
Sudan became their base of operations for training “the faithful.” (Laqueur, 2003)  
This organization would transform into Al Qa’ida, which began operating 
strategically and globally, attacking the World Trade Center in 1993, U.S. military 
bases in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
in 1998, the USS COLE in Yemen in 2000, and the Pentagon and World Trade 
Center in 2001. (Pape, 2003) Whatever their motivations, throughout history, 
terrorists have proven that they have the ability to adapt, deny, exploit and 
subvert mainstream culture depending on their needs.  Predictions on the future 
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of terrorism are dire for our society, especially as technological developments 
and the products of globalization allow tiny sects and local groups to enact broad 
campaigns with minimal resources.  
 
2.  Principles 
As a type of warfare, terrorism is a form of psychological operation in an 
asymmetric environment.  Terrorists rely on surprise and deception to instill fear 
into their target audience and overcome the tactical advantage of their 
adversary.   
Surprise is even more important in terrorism than in war: there are 
no massive troop concentrations, no major logistic preparations, 
and surprise attacks can come from unexpected quarters and 
through unexpected tactics.  Deception plays a role in terrorism 
planning and so does innovation. (Laqueur, 2003) 
The principles of terrorist warfare shape the terrorists as they use them.  
The requirement to maintain the element of surprise leads to adaptability and 
innovation in tactics, weapons, organizational structures, and support 
mechanisms.  Besides its open nature, urbanization and technical progress has 
made our society more vulnerable than before. (Laqueur, 2003) The new global 
terrorist organization does not depend on state sponsorship anymore but on its 
ability to use crime, the international monetary exchange and other assets of 
globalization to support its operations.  
Opponents are sensitive to the strengths as well as the 
weaknesses of governments; terrorists engage in a process of 
constant adaptation to the strategic environment.  Moving to greater 
destructiveness may be a reaction to a need to retain the initiative 
as governments find means of countering existing capabilities. 
(Crenshaw, 2001)  
In order to survive in the terrorist arena these days, the organization must 
know how to use the media to its advantage, how to explore modern weaponry 
and technology while maintaining knowledge of the conventional, how to recruit 
and train others, and how to maintain covert communications and operations 
across the globe.  They “continue to exploit a tactical advantage. The militants 
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operate in an ever-changing constellation of cells, moving freely from country to 
country across the continent, guided by opportunity and fanaticism.” (Golden, 
Butler, & Van Natta, 2004)  It is the terrorists’ ability to adapt that challenges us 
the most. While “among the infidels,” Muslim terrorists modify their usual 
behavior, shaving their beards, consuming alcohol, or missing daily prayer - 
anything to avoid suspicion in alien societies. In the Madrid bombings in 2004, 
the “suicide bombers were replaced by triggering devices engineered with cheap 
cell phones.” (Golden, et al., 2004)  In addition, the terrorists in Madrid changed 
their command and control tactics by practicing communication security in the 
days before and after the attacks. Furthermore, “[a]s pressure on Al Qaeda’s 
leadership mounted, the militants adapted. Radical imams took their message 
underground, Muslim extremists appeared to regroup into smaller, more transient 
cells, intelligence officials say, with fewer discernible ties to the Qaeda 
hierarchy.” (Golden, et al., 2004)  Yet, as in Western society and military, terrorist 
innovation is a process based on historical example, experience, and 
technological capability. (Crenshaw, 2001)  Therefore, it is possible to imagine 
the potential paths in their innovative process by assessing these factors. A 
terrorists’ “mindset, modus operandi, and target selection” based on their 
doctrine, public statements, and previous successful and failed plots can 
generate attack indicators.  The endeavor to identify these indicators drives this 
case study, as it drives the counterterrorist agencies in their efforts to prevent 
future attacks and disrupt terrorist activity.  
 
3.  Current Branches in the Study of Terrorism 
“The discipline of the study of terrorism is a recent development; it goes 
back no further than the early 1970s.” (Laqueur, 2003) There are five main 
approaches to studying terrorism: general theory, organizations, motivations, 
methods, and counter-strategy.   These different examinations allow for varied 
interpretations and understandings of the subject.  General theorists attempt to 
examine the history of terrorism and its effect on society, while the others 
examine the various aspects of terrorism separately from each other.  In addition, 
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the general theorists often attempt to track the innovations and trends in 
terrorism, and then debate counter-terrorism strategies.  In the discussions on 
organization, theories about small group dynamics, hierarchical structures, secret 
societies, and organizational relationships have shed considerable light on the 
inner workings of these organizations.  While observing motivations, other 
theorists have debated psychology versus ideology, pathology versus behavioral 
conditioning, and strategy versus tactic.  Furthermore, the examinations of 
terrorist methods (suicide bombing, assassination, hijacking or kidnapping) let 
the scholars divine their tactics and countermeasures.  “Understanding the type 
of terrorist group involved can provide insight into the likeliest manifestations of 
its violence and the most typical patterns of its development.” (Cronin, 2002) 
Overall, the entire purpose for dissecting terrorism into these five areas is to 
develop policies and objectives to eradicate it from our society.  Yet, for the 
purpose of this case study, there are mainly two relevant discussions: the role of 
ideology and the trends of globalization and technology.  
 
B. ROLE OF IDEOLOGY 
“An organization’s success or failure is measured in terms of its ability to 
attain its stated political ends.” (Crenshaw, 2001) As with any organization, a 
terrorist’s doctrine provides insights into their operations.  Ideological doctrine 
allows us to see how terrorists see the world: whom they see as their enemies, 
what inspires their soldiers, etc.  As potential targets, we must try to analyze their 
doctrine in order to prevent attacks and counter propaganda.   
While it is not the only factor which determines whether a potential 
target is attacked; ideology provides an initial range of legitimate 
targets and a means by which terrorists seek to justify attacks, both 
to the outside world and to themselves. (Drake, 1998)  
It does this by transforming people and objects into symbols, representing that 
with which they are fighting.  Yet, other factors do remain for consideration, 
particularly the availability of targets and the resources of the group concerned. 
(Drake, 1998)  
22 
With the current trend towards religious fundamentalism in terrorism, this 
idea is even more relevant.   
[W]ith the attempts of Al Qa’ida under Osama bin Laden to 
establish something like an international coordination bureau of 
Muslim terrorist groups and an International Brigade, the role of 
Islamic terrorism became predominant and most other terrorist 
groups became marginal…. (Laqueur, 2003)  
For this type of terrorist organization, the West, and mostly America, is the 
greatest threat to them. Following this, the aim of radical Islamic terrorists is to 
weaken the West in any way imaginable.   
In the case of al-Qaeda, much insight into its warfare proclivity can 
be gained by examining its training manual, which spells out 
missions that include destroying a nation’s foreign embassies, 
critical infrastructure nodes (such as vital economic centers and 
bridges), and even places of amusement (because they are 
considered sinful. (Sinai, 2003)   
In recent statements, Al Qa’ida leaders expanded this target set to include 
anyone “helping the infidels against the Muslims in any way, shape or form” even 
if they are good Muslims in every other manner. (MEIC, 2004)  Al Qa’ida uses 
this ability to adapt their ideology along with their tactics to continue their attacks 
on Western culture.  These terrorists mainly fear globalization, viewing it as the 
extermination of national cultures along with territorial boundaries. (Stern, 2003)  
This fear has even motivated the Sunni Al Qa’ida to bend their ideology in order 
to cooperate with the Shi’a Hezbollah terrorist group. (Stern, 2003)  Yet even as 
they fight against globalization and Western society, these terrorists use these 
very same products and technology to deliver their message internationally.  
 
C. GLOBALIZATION & TECHNOLOGY 
[T]he tools of the global information age have led to enhanced 
efficiency in many terrorist-related activities, including 
administrative tasks, coordination of operations, recruitment of 
potential members, communication among adherents, and 
attraction of sympathizers. (Cronin, 2002)   
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Information technology has extended the reach of terrorists, providing 
them access across international borders, and broadening their base for recruits 
and financial resources. However, globalization does not require higher 
technology. It requires innovation of traditional methods to cross physical and 
commercial borders. The Internet, mobile phones, and tools such as instant 
messaging allow for communication and coordination in ways not previously 
available. Chat rooms allow for recruitment or other tasks in covert yet public 
means. Al Qa’ida even attempted to recruit Latino Muslims with U.S. passports in 
order to recruit less suspicious looking members.(Stern, 2003)  Besides the chat 
rooms, terrorists have used the Internet to encrypt messages, collect intelligence, 
publish online training manuals, and send propaganda to the media – greatly 
facilitating the growth and networking capacity of terrorist organizations. Al 
Qa’ida has proven the most adept at adopting the newest tools of technology and 
adapting to fit their ends.  
Over its life span, al Qaeda has constantly evolved and shown a 
surprising willingness to adapt its mission. This capacity for change 
has consistently made the group more appealing to recruits, 
attracted surprising new allies, and – most worrisome from a 
Western perspective – made it harder to detect and destroy. (Stern, 
2003)  
This is specifically why those concerned with defeating terrorism must radically 
innovate, to show a similar willingness to change not only methods of defense 































IV. HOMELAND SECURITY VULNERABILITY IDENTIFICATION 
A. PURPOSE OF IDENTIFICATION 
Since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the United States has 
dramatically changed its response toward terrorism.  Prior to that, the United 
States largely treated terrorist attacks as criminal acts. In that respect, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) pursued terrorists as criminals, relying on 
evidence gleaned from investigations. After the attack on the Pentagon and 
World Trade Center, “President Bush broke with that practice – and with that 
frame of mind – when he decided that 9/11 meant that we are at war. He decided 
that the U.S. would respond not with the FBI and the U.S. attorneys, but with our 
armed forces and every instrument of U.S. national power.” (Feith, 2004)  The 
decision to acknowledge a war with terrorists has many consequences.  The 
major consequence was that the military became heavily engaged in combating 
terrorism. By involving the armed forces, the full spectrum of participation goes 
beyond sending combat units into Afghanistan and Iraq.  The conduct of war 
requires strategy, tactics, intelligence, and of course, defensive measures. 
Strategic development, as previously seen in the Bartlett Model (Figure 1), is an 
iterative process that requires assessing the security environment, weighing the 
risks, defining national goals, formulating strategies, and planning force 
structures by balancing resources. (Bartlett et al, 2000)  In formulating its 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the United States decided to 
approach it through four main strategies: (White House, 2003) 
(1) Defeat the terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, 
command, control and communications, material support, and 
finances; 
(2) Deny [terrorists’] sponsorship, support and sanctuary by 
ensuring other states accept their responsibility in the war on 
terrorism;  
(3) Diminish the underlying conditions that lead to terrorism; and  
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(4) Defend the United States, its citizens, its domestic and foreign 
interests by proactively protecting and extending its defenses to 
ensure identification and neutralization of the threat.  
To defend the United States from terrorists; the National Strategy further 
delineates the goal into the following objectives: (White House, 2003)  
(1) implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security;  
(2) attain domain awareness;  
(3) enhance measures to ensure integrity, reliability, and availability 
of critical physical and information-based infrastructures;  
(4) integrate measures to protect United States’ citizens abroad; 
and  
(5) ensure an integrated incident management capability.  
In order to provide adequate defense against attacks, it becomes necessary to 
identify vulnerabilities and countermeasures.  The national strategy does not 
state the preferred method for identifying vulnerabilities and developing 
countermeasures, allowing for an integrated approach using various methods.  
The responsibility belongs to everyone and each organization must continually 
assess itself as potential threats develop.   
 
B. USING MILITARY OFFICERS TO IDENTIFY VULNERABILITIES 
For this case study, we used military officers on red teams to focus on 
maritime vulnerabilities. By using military officers to identify vulnerabilities in our 
systems, the United States can take advantage of the officers’ technical 
knowledge and tactical experience. By applying this knowledge to public and 
private systems, the military officers provide insights and avenues of attack not 
previously considered by the traditional security and criminal experts. In addition, 
the military has a professional exercise history with the knowledge base of the 
conduct of ‘war games’ and research into gaming and decision-making theory. 
Furthermore, the psychological indoctrination of the military is similar to that of 
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most terrorist groups.  Yet, military officers do differ from terrorists and these 
differences will affect the experiment.  
Through the course of their careers, military officers gain an 
understanding of policy, doctrine, objectives, and maneuver.  Depending on the 
community in which they specialize, military officers are required to learn 
everything from small arms engagement tactics to strategic operations campaign 
planning.  As they progress through their career, their training emphasizes 
national and strategic decision-making based on resource allocation, budget, 
threat analysis, and end-state objectives.  In addition, the majority of officers 
regularly participate in field exercises or formal seminar games, which imparts to 
them the importance of the exercise elements.  The military train and exercise 
these officers in campaign, deliberate, and crisis action planning in order to 
achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.     
Beyond their training and experience, the psychological influence of the 
military is extremely similar to a terrorist organization.   
Every army aims to do what the terrorist group does: to link a larger 
group cause with the small-group dynamics that can deliver 
individuals to sacrifice. Every army cuts trainees off from their 
previous lives so that the combat unit can become their family; their 
fellow-soldiers become their brothers and their fear of letting down 
their comrades becomes greater than their fear of dying. 
(McCauley, 2002)  
Armies specifically nurture this psychology of sacrifice and elitism in units that 
focus on covert and lethal missions, such as special operations forces, very 
similar to terrorists’ suicide bombers.   By not only separating these individuals 
from society, but by setting them above it, certain behaviors and attitudes 
develop towards ‘brothers’ and ‘others’. This discipline allows the individual to 
subvert himself to the collective goal, incorporating his actions into a higher 
strategy by making him accountable and responsible to the larger group.  While 
individuals in other organizations may be familiar with this attitude, nowhere else 
is it as developed and nurtured as systematically as in terrorist organizations and 
military units.  
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Unfortunately, there are three main drawbacks to using military officers as 
team members. Military officers are usually generalists and not specialists.  
Although well educated and extremely bright, few officers fully and consistently 
use the technical knowledge they possess.  Most units shuffle officers through 
different types of jobs in their early assignments in order to familiarize them with 
all aspects of operations. In addition, although the military extensively practices 
force protection, most military members are not terrorism experts.  This has 
changed in recent years, but most officers still only have a passing knowledge 
garnered from the media and intelligence briefings.  The other major gap in 
officers’ background is private commerce and business.  Many officers 
understand the principles of business and finance, but they lack experience in 
dealing with unions, market competitors, and local or state agencies.  These 
factors often bring new difficulties to private enterprises that a military officer may 
not fully recognize.  However, this unfamiliarity with the business issues may 
allow for an objective look at the target’s security.  
 
C. FOCUS ON MARITIME VULNERABILITIES 
Another major consequence of the attack on September 11, 2001, was the 
intense scrutiny directed towards our transportation systems.  Although aviation 
is critical to the U.S. economy, the maritime industry is even more vital to our way 
of life.   
In a 2002 simulation of a terrorist attack involving cargo containers, 
every seaport in the United States was shut down, resulting in a 
loss of $58 billion in revenue to the U.S. economy, including 
spoilage, loss of sales, and manufacturing slowdowns and halts in 
production.1(GAO, 2003)  
The six million cargo containers that pass through our ports each year represent 
an enormous opportunity for smuggling, as evidenced by narcotics traffic in the 
past.  These two main factors led us to examine maritime targets: the critical 
nature of shipping to the economy and the security characteristics of our ports.                                              
1 We assume that the simulation resulted in $58 billion per day – but the source does not 
state the parameters.. The simulation was sponsored by Booz Allen Hamilton and The 
Conference Board in 2002 with representatives from government and industry. (GAO, 2003)  
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1.  Shipping Industry 
International commerce depends on seaports as critical gateways.  Over 
95 percent of non-North American foreign trade arrives by ship to our country, 
including 100 percent of certain commodities, such as foreign oil. (GAO, 2002) 
Approximately 90 percent of the world’s cargo moves by container, with six 
million containers entering into the United States each year.  “In 2001, 
approximately 5,400 ships carrying multinational crews and cargoes from around 
the globe made more than 60,000 U.S. port calls each year.” (GAO, 2002)  Due 
to the shift in commerce to “just-in-time” deliveries of goods, if agencies slowed 
the process for inspections of all or a majority of containers, the flow of goods 
would be “economically intolerable.” (GAO, 2002)  Furthermore, security 
measures are often too expensive for the transportation industry due to its thin 
profit margin.  Another problem for the shipping industry is the difficulty of 
verifying credentials for mariners. A recent Coast Guard review of 200,000 ship 
operators and crewmembers identified nine possible associates of terrorist 
groups, almost a dozen others under warrant for arrest, and thousands of alleged 
cases of credential fraud. (Johnson, 2004) With the increased requirements to 
restrict access to sensitive areas, it is essential to identify unauthorized 
personnel operating with false credentials in seaports and harbors.  
 
2. Characteristics of Ports 
Seaports are often extensive in size and accessible by water and land.  
Located in or near major metropolitan areas, most are enmeshed within the 
urban infrastructure.  In addition, ports combine multiple modes of transportation 
within one area, allowing for a concentration of passengers, high-value cargo, 
and hazardous materials.   
Security is made more difficult by the many stakeholders, public 
and private, involved in port operations. These stakeholders include 
local, state, and federal agencies; multiple law enforcement 
jurisdictions; transportation and trade companies; and factories and 
other businesses. (GAO, 2003) 
30 
For example, although the federal government has jurisdiction over 
harbors and interstate and foreign commerce, state and local governments are 
the main port regulators.  Moreover, each port is unique in the arrangement of its 
management and organization.   
 
3.  Maritime Transportation Security Act 
a.  Background 
Recognizing the difficulties inherent in securing seaports 
nationwide, the United States Congress passed the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA) in November 2002. This act covers a broad range of 
programs to improve security conditions at the ports and along U.S. waterways 
by identifying and tracking vessels, assessing preparedness, and limiting access 
to sensitive areas.  By combining some old agencies and creating others, MTSA 
addresses the various aspects of port security. The primary agency responsible 
is the United States Coast Guard (USCG), supported by the Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  
However, several difficulties continue to hinder successful implementation of the 
required security measures, to include funding, jurisdiction, agency 
reorganization, and standards. (GAO, 2003) 
 
b.  United States Coast Guard 
The MTSA tasked the USCG with performing risk assessments at 
the nation’s seaports, deploying patrols and security teams, establishing security 
planning and zones, and increasing ship surveillance and identification.  
Security assessments are intended to be in-depth examinations of 
security threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and conditions 
throughout a port, including not just transportation facilities, but also 
factories and other installations that pose potential security risks. 
(GAO, 2003)   
These assessments are being conducted by an independent review 
agency at medium-sized ports and larger, mainly due to the cost of nearly one 
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million dollars per report.  Private stakeholders have voiced the concern that 
these assessments are of little utility in comparison to their own security reviews, 
but the USCG believes that these assessments give the comprehensive 
perspective necessary to validate additional security assets and personnel.  In 
addition to the port assessments, the USCG created new rapidly deployable 
Maritime Safety and Security teams, designed to provide protection for strategic 
shipping, high-interest vessels, and critical infrastructure.  As of September 2003, 
the USCG deployed four teams at the ports of Seattle, Galveston, Norfolk, and 
Los Angeles. Additional teams are budgeted in 2004 for the cities of Honolulu, 
San Diego, Boston, San Francisco, New Orleans, and Miami.  These teams are 
in addition to the redeployment of the USCG cutters and vessels in accordance 
with its new priorities and to the establishment and review of security zones in 
high-interest ports.  
Other USCG efforts will require long-term investment and budget 
allocation. One major hurdle facing the USCG is the approval of security plans 
for domestic and foreign vessels.  According to their estimates, it will cost 
approximately $70 million as part of the 2004 budget and require 150 full-time 
personnel to review and approve individual security plans for domestic vessels 
and facilities.  In accordance with international agreement, each country of 
registry must approve their vessels’ security plans for force protection.2  Yet, 
some flag states have suspicious records of enforcing safety requirements in 
previous efforts at maritime security.  The USCG plans to use extensive 
surveillance as part of its oversight of vessels bound for U.S. waters and lacks a 
contingency plan in case stronger measures are necessary.   The Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) is one of the necessary ingredients to this 
surveillance.  Through a long-term implementation process, this system will use 
“a device aboard a vessel to transmit a unique identifying signal to a receiver 
located at the port and to other ships in the area.” (GAO, 2003)  Currently, only 
the larger domestic commercial vessels are required to install the tracking 
                                            
2International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code implemented on July 1, 2004 
(GAO, 2003) 
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equipment by the end of 2004.  Each set of tracking equipment costs an average 
of $10,000 per vessel to its owner.  However, this system requires the 
infrastructure present in the Vessel Traffic Service system, and thus is limited to 
half of the nation’s 25 busiest ports.3 Expanding the coverage of the VTS will 
require substantial funding and investment from private and public stakeholders, 
to include installation and training costs estimated between $62 and $120 million. 
(GAO, 2003) 
 
c.  Customs and Border Protection 
During the reorganization into the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), the United States created the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) by combining the Customs Service (USCS), the Border Patrol 
(USBP), and elements of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and 
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).  MTSA tasked CBP with inspecting cargo and 
containers, to include pre-screening and establishing standards, establishing a 
system for identifying suspicious persons, and documenting travelers. Thus far, 
the CBP has established a National Container Targeting Center, refined the 
previous system used for narcotics, instituted a national training program for 
targeting personnel, and promulgated regulations to improve the quality and 
timeliness of data on cargo containers. In addition, their Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) places staff at various foreign seaports in order to coordinate 
directly with their counterparts in the inspection and verification of high-risk 
containers prior to their departure to American seaports. Another CBP effort is 
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a cooperative 
program between CBP and various members of the international trade 
community.  These private companies agree to improve the internal security of 
their supply chains in return for the reduced likelihood that CBP will inspect their 
containers and cause a slowdown in their system.  (CBP, 2004)  
                                            
3 Ports and regions with VTS infrastructure include Los Angeles/Long Beach, New York/New 
Jersey, Mississippi River, New Orleans, Houston/Galveston, Port Arthur, San Francisco, 
Seattle/Tacoma, Prince William Sound, and Sault Ste. Marie. (GAO, 2003) 
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However, the General Accounting Office (GAO) remains concerned 
about the progress of the CBP implementation strategy.  CBP still lacks a 
national system for reporting and analyzing the inspection statistics, which 
negates any likelihood of increased success in targeting containers. In addition, 
data is not available by risk level, is not uniformly reported, is difficult to interpret, 
and is often incomplete.  Although CBP has trained targeting personnel, they 
have yet to establish testing or certification standards.  The large volume of 
imports and the limited resources of CBP decrease their capability to inspect all 
oceangoing containers without disrupting the flow of commerce.  Furthermore, 
space limitations and safety concerns at the seaports constrain effective 
utilization of screening equipment.  Finally, the CBP is missing the key elements 
of risk management in their strategy because they failed to complete a 
comprehensive set of criticality, vulnerability, and risk assessments to their 
current systems. (GAO, 2003) 
 
d.  Transportation Security Administration 
In November 2001, the federal government created the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in order to establish needed 
standards, to protect all transportation systems, to create a credentialing system 
for transportation workers, to develop security standards, to promulgate 
regulations to implement standards, and to monitor the execution of the 
regulations. Among other passenger and aviation security measures, the two 
main TSA initiatives that affect port security are the Maritime and Land Security 
Grant Program and the Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC). The 
Maritime and Land Security Grant Program provides financial assistance to help 
private stakeholders defray the cost of implementing security measures locally.  
In order to limit access to restricted areas of all transportation facilities, TSA is 
developing an identification card based on biometrics. Testing different 
technology credentialing systems on sample cards occurred in 2003. In 2004, 
TSA began testing the prototypes of the entire security card process, to include 
background checks, collecting biometric information, verifying identities, and 
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issuing cards. Yet, it will be a daunting task to implement the TWIC nationwide, 
as the agency expects to issue “five to six million identification cards a year from 
mid-2004 to the end of 2007.” (GAO, 2003) Furthermore, they are still 
consolidating input on the varied requirements, in order to develop the necessary 
programs and policies to implement the system across all transportation facilities.   
 
e.  Challenges implementing MTSA 
MTSA faces major challenges in its implementation: the 
reorganization of agencies into the DHS, available funding, delineation of 
jurisdiction, and establishment of standards. The federal reorganization into DHS 
is the most extensive in over half a century and occurred five months after the 
enactment of MTSA.  New chains of command, reporting responsibilities, and 
policies created more difficulties than first imagined when Congress passed 
MTSA.  In addition, funding for implementation is scarce while costs are high.  
The USCG estimates that the cost of implementation of the International 
Maritime Organization Security code and the MTSA will be approximately $1.5 
billion for the first year and $7.4 billion in the next decade. (GAO, 2003) This 
does not include the expenses mentioned previously for private port facility 
stakeholders and cargo vessel owners and operators. Prioritization for grants and 
other funding programs is vital to ensure that the most critical facilities are secure 
against attack. However, even with funding, the establishment of national 
standards remains a necessary requirement.  Authorities need to identify a 
security baseline for all facilities nationwide from which they can measure 
vulnerability and risk.  Due to the reorganization into DHS and the private/public 
nature of seaports, the determination of jurisdiction is essential for collaboration 
and coordination. With so many agencies and organizations involved, there is a 
high probability for a duplication of efforts, especially in intelligence and 




D.  SUMMARY  
Overall, the critical nature of seaports and the shipping industry coupled 
with the large number of potential vulnerabilities creates many opportunities for 
terrorists.  During the initial stages of implementing the security policies, the 
major reorganization into DHS, the lack of funding and resources, and the 
technological challenges magnify the vulnerabilities. It will require extensive 
assessment of facilities, methods, and threats in order to secure the seaports 
nationwide.  Although most of the concern focuses on cargo container security, 
there are other avenues of attack, besides smuggling devices through shipping, 
that could seriously hamper international trade and the U.S. economy. If we are 
to conduct counter-terrorist operations properly, it is essential to identify these 
other likely methods.   The key to defensive counter-terrorism is to decrease the 
opportunities available to terrorists.  The chance to use military officers to 
examine these systems allows a fresh perspective previously unavailable with 
criminal security experts and law enforcement officials.  Countering potential 
terrorism requires individuals with technical and tactical knowledge, operational 
planning experience, and combat conditioning.  The question remains: how 















































V. CASE STUDY 
A. INFORMAL MANUAL EXPERIMENT 
Due to the prohibitive nature of the expenses associated with a national 
level field exercise, enterprises normally utilize a verbal scenario or seminar war 
game for strategic and operational level assessments.  In this particular case 
study, five factors led to the use of an informal manual experiment:  
(1) budget and time constraints,  
(2) strategic nature of the campaign objective,  
(3) large number of agencies involved in maritime transportation and 
security,  
(4) lack of a sponsoring enterprise, and  
(5) the adaptability and variability of terrorist organizations.  
Consequently, the targeted federal and local agencies did not know that 
they were under scrutiny - creating certain constraints and benefits to our 
experiment.  The first constraint on the experiment proved to make the project 
more realistic in its conception.  The informal nature required the red teams to 
avoid detection and suspicion in their actions and intelligence gathering.  Any 
required communication or meeting area would have to be publicly available as 
well as covert to avoid counter-intelligence.  Furthermore, the manual nature of 
the experiment limited our use and development of ‘weapons’ and ‘tools’ to 
verbal descriptions.  Thus, the assessment of the success of the red team 
depends upon the measure of the realistic nature of the verbal descriptions 
rather than a staged attempt of an actual attack.  
 
B. SCENARIO 
1. Constraints & Resources 
The objective for the red teams was to think and act as a terrorist cell in 
order to plan an attack on coastal cities through maritime avenues.  The 
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terrorists’ stated doctrine and ideology dictated the sub-objectives for the attack.  
Each team had to decide on the target city and the actual target, the method of 
attack, communication and encryption methods, intelligence and research 
methods, meeting conditions, and an escape plan. The choice of weapons of 
mass destruction was not available to the team as an attack method in order to 
keep the experiment at the conventional level.  The progression of the case study 
allowed each team to initially research three targets in their city, primarily using 
the Internet in a manner similar to Thomas’ cyber planning. (Thomas, 2003) After 
this initial research, the teams briefed the rest of the class on their findings and 
then the class decided on the final targets.  Once the targets were set, the teams 
conducted further research on the details of the target and began to plan their 
communications and operational methods.  Additionally, each team traveled to 
their target city to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.  After their research 
trips, each team presented three possible courses of action to attack their 
targets.  Class discussions helped each team to choose the final attack method. 
The final presentation contained detailed planning of the operation to include 
communications requirements, the team’s budget, and supporting evidence to 
establish the realistic nature.  Furthermore, each team’s imaginary budget was 
limited to $75,000 in order to provide a more realistic nature to the exercise.  In 
addition, following Al Qa’ida methodology, the team had to invest half of their 
budget as suggested by the training manual.  Because so many choices were at 
the discretion of the team, each member’s experience and background was 
crucial to the effectiveness of the team.  
 
2.  Team Structure & Backgrounds 
Based on the style of the previous attack on September 11, 2001, the 
class broke into three teams in order to plan simultaneous attacks on three 
different cities.  It was also desirous to keep the size of each cell to an 
operational yet functional minimum.  Furthermore, in order to evaluate the 
differing nature on operations, the size of each team was different – creating 
teams of seven, five, and three members.  Therefore, each team’s structure was 
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different in their organization, background and expertise, and operational 
requirements.  Except for one team member, all of the students were Caucasian 
and have a Christian religious background.4  The students’ knowledge of 
terrorism was limited to general knowledge gained through brief presentations 
and the media, so it was necessary to train them in the terrorist doctrine and 
provide them with direction.  
 
                                            
4 The one member was Asian-American, and did chose not respond to the question about 
religion on the Background Questionnaire.  
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Table 1: General Composition of Red Teams 





 NAVY 7 1 2 
 AIR FORCE   1 
 MARINE CORPS  4  
SPECIALTY 
 Surface Warfare 4 1  
 Naval Flight 2   
 Submarine 1  1 
 Communications  3 1 
 Infantry  1  
 Cryptology   1 
UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 
 BA Economics 1   
 BA Speech Communications 1   
 BS Computer Science 2 1 1 
 BS Political Science 1 1 1 
 BS Bioenvironmental Science 1   
 BS Mechanical Engineering  1  
 BS Industrial Distribution  1  
 BA Marketing  1  
 BA Russian Studies   1 
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Table 2: General Composition of Red Teams (cont.) 





 MS Information Systems 7 1 1 
 MS Business Administration  1  
 MS Computer Science  1 1 
 MSSE Information Warfare  2 2 
 MS Information Technology 
Management 
 1  
 MS Information Systems 7 1 1 
RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND 
 Catholic & Roman Catholic 2 3  
 Christian 1   
 Episcopal 1   
 Protestant   2 
 No Comment 3 2 1 
RACE 
 Caucasian 4 2 3 
 European American 1   
 No Comment 2 3  
SEX 
 Male 6 5 2 
 Female 1  1 
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Table 3: Military Education of Red Teams 





 Surface Warfare – Basic 3 1  
 Submarine Warfare – Basic 1  1 
 Cryptology – Basic   1 
 Strike Lead Attack Training 1   
 Infantry  1  
 Expeditionary Warfare  1  
 Communications & Information Systems 1 2 1 
 Steam Engineering 2   
 Nuclear Power   1 
 Naval Warfare College – JPME Phase 1 1  1 
 Naval Science Institute   1 
 Airborne Mission Commander 1   
 Combat Squad Leader  1  
 Combat Water Survival  1  
 Fire Support Coordination  1  
 Operations Security Program Manager   1 
 Expeditionary Warfare – Intelligence   1 
 Air Force Squadron Officer   1 
 Information Systems Security Officer  1  
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3. Doctrine 
In order to train the officers of the class on terrorist methods and 
objectives, we provided the team with a previous thesis on the “Terrorist Use of 
Information Operations” (Buettner, Emery. & Earl, 2003), an article on “Cyber 
Planning as a Concept” (Thomas, 2003) and with the Al Qa’ida training manual. 
(”Al Qaeda Training Manual,” 2004)  The previous thesis familiarized the teams 
with various tools and tactics of terrorists.  It explained how and why terrorists 
attempt to influence their audiences, communicate between various cells, and 
facilitate their operations.  Since their inception, terrorists have continuously 
employed what the U.S. military terms as Information Operations.  With the 
increase in global communication, their accumulated knowledge is even more 
applicable to their various objectives.  
 From the manual, Al Qa’ida states its main mission as: “[t]he overthrow of 
the godless regime and their replacement with an Islamic regime.” The sub-
objectives for this mission include: (”Al Qaeda Training Manual,” 2004) 
1. Gathering information about the enemy, the land, the 
installations, and the neighbors. 
2.  Kidnapping enemy personnel, documents, secrets, and arms.  
3.  Assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists. 
4.  Freeing the brothers who are captured by the enemy.  
5.  Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people 
against the enemy.  
6.  Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, 
and sin; not a vital target.  
7.  Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital 
economic centers. 
8.  Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the cities.  
Furthermore, the “military organization” is important to accomplish these 
missions for the following reasons: (”Al Qaeda Training Manual,” 2004) 
44 
1. Removal of those personalities that block the call’s path. All 
types of civilian intellectuals and thinkers for the state.  
2.  Proper utilization of the individuals’ unused capabilities.  
3. Precision in performing tasks, and using collective views on 
completing a job from all aspects, not just one.  
4.  Controlling the work and not fragmenting it or deviating from it.  
5.  Achieving long-term goals such as the establishment of an 
Islamic state and short-term goals such as operations against 
enemy individuals and sectors.  
6.  Establishing the conditions for possible confrontation with the 
regressive regimes and their persistence.  
7.  Achieving discipline in secrecy and through tasks.  
The other lessons from their training manual cover: recruit requirements; 
counterfeit currency and forged documents; military bases to include apartments 
and hiding places; means of communication and transportation; training; 
weapons purchase and delivery; and member safety (operations security).   
 
4.  Target City Selection 
 Al-Qaeda’s modus operandi, as demonstrated by the 11 
September attacks and outlined in its training manual, involves 
meticulous planning, training, and precisely timed simultaneous 
execution. (Sinai, 2003)  
We asked each team to target a separate city on the west coast of the 
United States based on its ability to achieve the desired objectives derived from 
the terrorist doctrine and ideology.  Due to their economic, military, and tourist 
nature, the teams chose the cities of Seattle, San Diego, and San Francisco.  
Each of these cities is an active commercial port that supports its regional 
economies.  In San Francisco, the landmark nature of the Golden Gate Bridge 
was seen as a desirous and therefore potential target.  Furthermore, the naval 
bases in Seattle and San Diego added a significant opportunity to the teams as 
an avenue of attack. Once assigned with their individual cities, the next task for 
45 
the red teams was to research their respective cities in order to identify their 
targets and avenues of attack.   
 
C. TARGET SELECTION 
1. Seattle 
Following initial research about the city of Seattle, Washington, the cell 
offered three targets: the Washington State Ferry system, the Space Needle, and 
the commercial port.  Although an interesting target from the tourist perspective, 
the class decided the ferry offered more tourists than the Space Needle.  The 
sheer number of tourists, commuters, and other passengers on any ferry at any 
one time made it a highly desirable target.  Additionally, the commercial port 
seemed more difficult to access from land and sea, whereas the ferry terminals 
have to be publicly accessible by their very nature.  Therefore, for the city of 
Seattle, the ferries stood out as the most profitable target to the teams in 
accordance with Al Qa’ida’s secondary objective of “[b]lasting and destroying the 
embassies and attacking vital economic centers”. (”Al Qaeda Training Manual,” 
2004)  
 
2.  San Francisco 
For San Francisco, even though the team offered other targets such as 
the 3Com Park at Candlestick Point, there never could have been another target 
in the city as desirable as the Golden Gate Bridge. Besides being a major 
roadway under constant maintenance that transports thousands of motorists and 
pedestrians from one side of the bay to the other, the Golden Gate is a national 
landmark of the United States. Built during the Great Depression, it has become 
a symbol and testament to the American spirit.  The suspension style of the 
bridge complicates the access through maritime tactics.  However, even though 
San Francisco does have other potential targets that are accessible by maritime 
avenues, no other target would be as symbolic if successfully destroyed as the 
Golden Gate Bridge. Al Qa’ida further advocated this type of target in their 
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secondary objective of “[b]lasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of 
the cities.” (”Al Qaeda Training Manual,” 2004)  
 
3.  San Diego 
In San Diego, due to the military presence and city layout, multiple targets 
are available for attack.  After their initial research, the cell offered the following 
possible targets: Coronado – San Diego Bay Bridge, the new Petco baseball 
stadium of the San Diego Padres, and an in-port submarine at the base in Point 
Loma.  Since the San Francisco cell focused on the Golden Gate Bridge, an 
attack on the Coronado Bay Bridge seemed redundant and superfluous.  In 
addition, the baseball stadium is not truly accessible from maritime avenues, 
limiting the applicability with the theme of the experiment.   Furthermore, after 
reviewing the objectives from the Al Qa’ida training manual, the potential attack 
of a naval submarine while ‘safely’ in port in the United States seemed more in 
line with the overall mission, specifically Al Qa’ida’s secondary objective of 
“[a]ssassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists.” (”Al Qaeda 
Training Manual,” 2004)  
 
D. COMMUNICATIONS 
Communication is the most dangerous undertaking of any underground 
organization.  The likelihood of detection increases with each message 
communicated outside the cell.  For this reason, covert communications that are 
publicly available are essential to any terrorist organization.  The Al Qa’ida 
training manual identifies their communication methods in the following manner: 
(1) the telephone, (2) meeting in-person, (3) messenger, (4) letters, and (5) 
modern devices (facsimile & wireless). (”Al Qaeda Training Manual,” 2004)  
Globalization and technology have only improved the accessibility to covert 
modes of communication.  On the Internet, terrorists conduct their business and 
communications through electronic mail (e-mail), steganography, web logs 
(blogs), instant messaging, chat rooms, and public encryption.  Furthermore, with 
anonymous surfing and e-mail capability, one can accomplish all of the above 
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from an anonymous IP address.  With the increased availability of satellite and 
disposable cell phones with Internet access and text messaging, organizations 
can choose from more methods of communication than ever before.  Of course, 
when it is necessary to meet in person, colleges, bars and cafes, libraries, and 
hotels all offer publicly accessible meeting areas that can offer privacy and 
seclusion to clandestine activities.  The Al Qa’ida training manual even 
recommends secret signals and other security measures for these meetings in 
order to defeat potential surveillance.   
Each cell leader had to decide which type of communication they would 
rely on during the experiment. Every member of each team had to sign up for a 
publicly available web-based e-mail account using a pseudonym.  The Seattle 
team decided to use GO.com as an electronic dead-drop.  The San Francisco 
team relied on steganography to encrypt their messages.  The San Diego team 
used an off-line keyword encryption method with their e-mail accounts and 
created a blog on a publicly available website for major announcements.  
Furthermore, each team decided to use instant text messaging from disposable 
cell phones for coordination on the day of the attack.  
 
E.  RESEARCH & INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
1. Pre-deployment 
Prior to their trips to their respective cities, each cell used other resources 
to learn as much as possible about their targets.  Mainly using information 
obtained from the Internet, each cell found that the reconnaissance visit should 
either confirm or reject their tentative plans.   If anyone ever wanted a piece of 
information, then someone has probably posted this information on the Internet.  
Blueprints, design plans, and system specifications were continuously available 
through the World Wide Web.  If not directly accessible from the source’s 
website, than other sites devoted to history, commerce, and tourism will have 
copies for their personnel and visitors.  The teams were able to find the majority 
of the necessary information on the targets through the Internet including 
earthquake-susceptibility design studies of bridges and the precise schedule and 
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traffic routes of the ferry system.  Libraries, experience, and textbooks provided 
the remaining information.  After this research, each team was able to develop an 
initial course of action in order to focus their efforts during their surveillance trip.   
 
2.  Reconnaissance & Surveillance Trip  
This focus allowed each team to spend only two days in their respective 
cities taking pictures and testing the boundaries of the varied security systems 
and plans.  By actually visiting and interacting with each target, each cell found 
similar security problems in all three cities.  Security checks, although stepped up 
since the September 11 attack, are still cursory in any place besides airports and 
military bases.  Even these were lacking as team members gained access to 
areas that should have been off limits to anyone besides unit personnel or rent 
vehicles with expired identification cards and licenses.   In addition, even in some 
areas where the team members truly had no business, they were able to use 
social engineering to obtain access into restricted areas without escorts.5  In 
other areas, the students simply acted as if they belonged in the area, and no 
one ever questioned their presence.  Furthermore, by acting as naïve tourists, 
team members were able to photograph all of these sensitive areas and potential 
targets, allowing the teams to examine the situations in depth after the trip.  
The true benefit of the reconnaissance and surveillance trip was the 
familiarity with the target gained by each team member.  After so much 
discussion and research, actually seeing and examining the target helped each 
team member to visualize the attack.  In addition, by trying to act as covertly as 
possible, the team members also glimpsed the mindset of underground 
organizations, those that have to avoid detection and suspicion for survival. The 
majority of the team members stayed in different hotels and had to find their own 
                                            
5 Social Engineering is defined as “an attacker us[ing] human interaction (social skills) to 
obtain or compromise information about an organization or its computer systems. An attacker 
may seem unassuming and respectable, possibly claiming to be a new employee, repair person, 
or researcher and even offering credentials to support that identity. However, by asking 
questions, he or she may be able to piece together enough information to infiltrate an 
organization's network. If an attacker is not able to gather enough information from one source, 
he or she may contact another source within the same organization and rely on the information 
from the first source to add to his or her credibility.” (U.S. CERT, 2004) 
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meeting places to discuss their findings.  Although the instructor provided us with 
“get out of jail” letters, the students would have considered it a matter of shame 
to have to use them.  As previously, stated, the cells developed initial courses of 
action prior to the trip so each team used this trip to plan the details and test the 
realism and effectiveness of their attacks.  Although the majority of the initial 
information proved viable, the cells had to reject some minor aspects of the plans 
after the surveillance trips.  Overall, the plans would not have been as realistic 
and effective without the reconnaissance and surveillance trip.   
 
F.  COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT & SELECTION 
After the reconnaissance visits, each cell proposed three courses of action 
for the attack on their respective targets.  The class then met to decide which to 
use.  The vital criterion for selection was effectiveness of the attack to the 
accomplishment of the overall mission.  Each cell discussed the secondary 
effects of the attack, including potential images for media consumption and the 
public announcements for release after the attack.   Each cell’s final presentation 
was the detailed planning for the entire operation to include organization, 
communications scheme, abort/evacuation plans, transportation and lodging 
plan, budget allocation, deception and supporting plans and the selected course 
of attack with timing and supporting data.  Each cell differed slightly in 
presentation, but each presentation relayed the potential for a highly successful 
attack against the selected targets.   
 
1.  Seattle 
In order to disable the port of Seattle, this cell decided to attack the 
Washington State Ferry system that operates in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and 
Puget Sound.  By employing five ammonium-nitrate bombs loaded on U-haul 
trucks onto five different ferries, the cell believed it could cause not only long-
term economic damage but also immediate panic and mayhem, not to mention 
the death of four to six thousand tourists and passengers. The cell leader would 
be in the local area coordinating the attacks through cell phone and monitoring 
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the progress on the Internet and television.  Minutes before the attack, the cell 
leader will contact the Mayor and local news offices by fax with a scripted 
message from the organization. In addition, the leader will contact the local 
television station and instruct them to look towards Elliott Bay for an explosive 
demonstration.  When all the devices are successfully set on the five ferries, 
each operator will detonate the bomb at a pre-selected time.  Although the ferry 
system is implementing a new security plan, the drive to satisfy consumers and 
meet timetables will most likely decrease the effectiveness of vehicle inspections 
and identification checks as security measures.  Just as on September 11, 2001, 
the concern for family members and friends will drive residents to call the 
emergency phone system, virtually causing a denial of service attack, decreasing 
the effectiveness of emergency responders and increasing the potential for more 
extensive damage.  
 
2.  San Francisco 
In San Francisco, the chosen course of action migrated from a maritime 
attack to direct action on the Golden Gate Bridge, but the plan still requires the 
use of a large commercial vessel as part of the deception operation.  The team 
would pose as a construction and maintenance team in order to take direct action 
on one of the two main cables of the suspension system.  Even if detected prior 
to the collapse of the bridge, the operating area is defensible and unobservable 
to most parts of the bridge and the Bay. Using thermite to melt through the cable, 
the team expects to create the illusion that the commercial vessel destroyed the 
bridge by crashing into one of its anchorages.  Again, the cell leader will contact 
the media minutes before the attack and warn of the impending crash of the 
commercial vessel, in order to draw attention away from the cable area and to 
stage the news helicopters in the area for maximum media coverage.  Besides 
the massive casualties to commuting passengers, the reconstruction and salvage 
efforts would dramatically influence the economy of the Bay area for months after 
the attack.  
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3.  San Diego 
Most of the force protection efforts around naval vessels focus on a 
potential small boat attack.  By using a bulk cargo commercial vessel, the San 
Diego cell decided to annul the majority of the current security measures. The 
commercial vessel would drive right through the defenses and onto the 
submarine, fouling its hatches and partially submerging the submarine.  
Immediately after impact, the operators aboard the vessel would detonate the 
ammonium nitrate contained in the ballast tanks, in order to provide visual effects 
to the attack and magnify the casualties in the area.  Furthermore, mixed in with 
the debris, the on-board operators would release some radioactive waste to 
spread the alarm of a “dirty bomb” and frighten the local residents and  further 
impact the economy. The crucial element requires the commercial vessel to 
conduct the attack as it departs San Diego Bay, which greatly increases the 
danger of detection prior to the attack. This plan also incorporates a warning to 
the media and environmentalists and a false Emergency Broadcast calling for 
evacuation.  Additionally, by exploding the nearby airport’s fuel farm, the cell 
planned to hinder the emergency responders and divert attention away from the 
commercial vessel as it strays from the traffic lanes. If effective, the attack would 
cause massive damage to the submarine and the surrounding pier area and the 
scare of radioactive waste would decrease tourism and commerce throughout 
the area.  
 
G.  SUMMARY OF VULNERABILITIES 
Even though the planned attacks seem difficult and complicated, the 
reconnaissance visits proved to the students that a degree of success was 
possible, mainly due to the number and scope of vulnerabilities available for 
exploitation.  Although each city and target had its own unique liabilities, the 
majority of the exploits took advantage of two major discrepancies: operations 
security vulnerabilities and improper security policy implementation.  A few 
significant discrepancies did not fit in either category.  
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1.  Operations Security Vulnerabilities 
From the joint U.S. doctrine, the definition of operations security 
vulnerability is “a condition in which friendly actions provide operations security 
indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an adversary in time 
to provide a basis for effective adversary decision-making.” (CJCS, 1998)  
Although an organization may discretely plan and execute a major operation, the 
normal daily unit requirements may provide enough information to the adversary 
to give indications of our intent, movements, and preparations. Unfortunately, the 
old adage is true - ‘Loose lips sink ships.’ The majority of the information required 
for this case study did not concern military movements, but civilian state and 
federal organizations that previously did not have to worry about the 
implementation of operations security.  Advertising is necessary to have a 
successful business and a healthy economy; however, the organizations need to 
screen the information that is available to the public via the Internet and media, in 
order to decrease the possibility of exploitation.  In particular, press releases, 
business presentations, blueprints, and design schemes assisted the efforts of 
the red teams in this case study. Web cameras and other imagery allowed for 
standoff intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  Furthermore, social 
engineering tactics were able to elicit even more information.  Most staff were 
happy to discuss their work and all matters related to their operations.  From 
security guards discussing the new procedures to construction men discussing 
the ways to get around them, the red teams were consistently able to find out 
details that provided clues to a successful attack.    
 
2.  Improper Security Policy Implementation 
A security policy is only as good as its implementation.  As simple as the 
axiom sounds, the truth of it revealed itself to the red teams during this case 
study.  Security personnel and staff ignored the required Identification checks, 
baggage and vehicle searches, and loitering at the various targets. Even in areas 
where security personnel were vigilant at their duties, social engineering through 
business contacts enabled the team members to circumvent their efforts. 
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Businesses and tourist attractions design their security plans to minimize cost, 
minimize impact on customers, maintain service levels and leverage existing 
resources through application of a risk-based approach.   Many rely on the use of 
surveillance equipment and detection devices to reduce the personnel required.  
The presence of law enforcement personnel was either ineffective or low at each 
site.   As previously stated, team members were able to gain access to sensitive 
areas merely by acting as if they belonged and were never questioned by any 
staff or security personnel. Even other passengers and tourists ignored the team 
members as they took photographs and discussed the plans. After the exercise 
was completed, checks with these organizations and agencies such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed no reports of suspicious activity 
matching the descriptions of the red teams had been made during the timeframe 
of the visits.   
 
3.  Other Discrepancies 
One of the most significant discrepancies was the result of departmental 
reorganization.  An airport fuel farm was unguarded and unobserved with open 
gates, allowing access for a long period without any interference.   According to 
the red team’s research, the fuel farm had belonged to the seaport, but during 
the shuffle into the Department of Homeland Security, the airport was supposed 
to take responsibility for its security.  At another target, maintenance personnel 
leave the keys to their Cushman vehicles in the ignition and park them in a 
publicly accessible area.  Staff personnel commonly use these vehicles 
throughout the site for transporting tools and personnel, acting as a passport to 
sensitive areas and as validation for a stranger’s presence.  Although the 
practice of leaving the keys in vehicles may have been more convenient for 
business and maintenance purposes, the potential risks outweigh these benefits.  
Although these vulnerabilities are important to remedy, we will not 
measure the effectiveness of this case study merely by their identification. As 
discussed previously, the effectiveness of the red team can take two approaches 
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and we must examine all of the benefits of the case study in order to measure its 
success.  
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VI. BENEFITS OF CASE STUDY 
Due to its manual seminar style, any benefits of the case study would be 
qualitative and subjective at best.  However, its nature also allows us to consider 
the broader effects of the study.   As previously mentioned, there are two 
methods to measure the effectiveness of a manual free form red team exercise: 
the decision-making approach and the event approach.  Using the event 
approach, we will examine the new tools and tactics used by the red teams to 
emulate terrorists.  The event approach will examine the innovation of the 
methods and means used; however, proof that these methods and means are in 
use by terrorists may not exist.  Using the decision-making approach, we will 
examine new insights and assessments about terrorist organizations as 
highlighted by the decisions made by the red teams.  The decision-making 
approach is much more subjective and therefore difficult to prove without a direct 
discussion with the adversary. 
 
A.  EVENT APPROACH 
One benefit of this case study is the increase in the understanding about 
the terrorists’ mindset and methods to the participating individuals and others.  
Researchers can gain an understanding by analyzing former attacks and 
cataloguing tactics and tools, but the red teams were able to step into the 
terrorists’ shoes and choose the tactics and tools themselves, depending on the 
details of the target.  In addition, the red teams proved the premise that necessity 
breeds innovation.  Each team was able to plan a different type of attack with 
similar tools and tactics.  
The Madrid bombings, which killed 202 people and wounded 1700, 
suggested that terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda could not only modify 
their tactics, but also adopt a mind-set different from the one 
investigators thought they knew. (Golden, et al., 2004)   
This adaptability is one of the most remarkable attributes of the terrorist 
cells linked to Al Qa’ida.  The necessity to adapt to the target and avoid detection 
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consistently breeds new tactics and tools as seen in the plans of the red teams. 
Specifically, the Seattle team did not base the use of U-Haul vehicles on 
historical accounts of bombings but on the fact that the Washington State Ferry 
system moves these larger vehicles to the center of the ferry due to height 
limitations, ensuring that the bomb would create the maximum damage to the 
ferry.  In San Diego, the commercial cargo vessel attacks the submarine as the 
cargo vessel leaves the Bay because the outbound maritime traffic lane brings 
the vessel closest to the submarine and provides an unobstructed angle for 
maneuver onto the submarine.  This type of attack subverts the force protection 
measures around the submarine because the Navy designed these measures to 
counter a small-boat, similar to the USS Cole attack.  However, it also thwarts 
the USCG standard operating procedures because their trigger for suspicious 
activity requires a vessel to ignore the rule that requires all vessels conducting 
U.S. port visits to notify the harbor authorities 48 hours prior to arrival.  
Additionally, the San Francisco team decided to use thermite on the suspension 
cable because it emits white smoke, similar to that from welding operations, as it 
burns through the metal and is inextinguishable by the usual means.  
The red teams also identified novel concepts in their communication and 
coordination plans.  At the time, the idea to use a web-based e-mail service as a 
dead drop for messages was a unique concept to the Seattle team, but in a 
recent issue of Al Battar (the Al Qa’ida online training magazine), the author 
suggests using websites as online dead drops. (Mansfield, 2004)  Reports of Al 
Qa’ida’s use of steganography suggest that the terrorists used it during the 
planning for the September 11 attacks. (Denning, 2004)   However, it is hard to 
detect and decipher without the original key as the San Francisco team 
discovered when they used it for covert communications, especially in this age of 
digital imagery.  In addition, the San Diego cell used a conventional off-line 
keyword encryption method, but the team passed the messages through an 
online web-based anonymous blog on baseball news.  For command and control, 
all three teams recommended the use of text messages on disposable cell 
phones to signal phases of the operation.  Furthermore, the Washington State 
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Ferry website tracks all of its vessels online through the Global Positioning 
System, allowing for remote command and control for the cell leader.  
 
B.  DECISION-MAKING APPROACH 
Although the previous tools and tactics are important to examine, the most 
beneficial aspect of this case study is the hardest to document and quantify.  “In 
particular, how and why the opponent employs his forces as he does is often the 
most critical element of learning and also one of the most difficult to interpret.” 
(Perla, 1990) Intelligence collectors and analysts may be able to adapt the tools 
and tactics to improve indications and warning of possible attacks, but a terrorist 
organization greatly differs from nation states in one aspect.  It relies on surprise 
and deception as critical elements of their operations. For a terrorist organization 
to be continuously successful, it must continue to adapt and change its profile to 
avoid detection.  Therefore, it is more important to learn how and why terrorists 
choose their tools and tactics instead of concentrating on the tools and tactics 
themselves.  
One observation concerns the organization of the cell itself. “The smaller 
the group, the more difficult it is to trace and to penetrate, the more far-fetched 
and strange its motivation and ideology is likely to be.” (Laqueur, 2003)  In 
addition, less communication and coordination was required for the smaller 
teams. In addition, these smaller teams appear less suspicious when gathering 
intelligence and conducting reconnaissance. The Seattle team overcame the 
large group disadvantage by using the online dead-drop to minimize 
communication requirements. In contrast, the San Francisco team transformed 
their cell into two smaller cells in order to decrease the detection signature.  Only 
the leader of each smaller cell could communicate with the other cell, and the 
subordinate members could only communicate with their leaders.  
One of the spin-offs from successful red teaming, when it is done 
correctly, is to develop among those who play on red teams a 
deeper understanding of potential opponents and how they might 
think about waging a potential conflict. (Murray, 2003)   
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By forcing the red teams to rely on their own knowledge and experiences with 
few constraints, the class members were able to immerse themselves in the role 
of the terrorists.  Although these officers will never be terrorist experts, they 
definitely glimpsed how a terrorist must think firsthand.  Constantly concerned 
with detection and surveillance, each cell member must concentrate on planning 
the objective without compromising the overall mission.   
Additionally, as we shared our results with DHS, FBI, and other city and 
regional agencies, the representatives came to the same conclusion: if a terrorist 
wants to attack a city, he can.6  “Given the terrorist proclivity for civilian targets, 
for the outrageous, and for the unexpected, defense may require the protection 
of too many links.” (Crenshaw, 2001)  For the most part, those concerned with 
domestic security are also those responsible for the service, law, order, health, 
and welfare of the population they represent.  Consequently, these 
responsibilities can color the decisions they make about security.  (Murray, 2003)  
Additionally, one tactic or tool can capture the attention of decision-makers and 
blind them to other possible methods and means. For example, the emphases on 
the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction in a cargo container or an attack 
by small boat on a navy vessel are two assumptions of the DHS and DOD. 
These assumptions drive the decision-makers in their selection of 
countermeasures.  The information from this case study convinced the majority 
of the representatives that terrorists would take advantage of any opportunity and 
that in order to counter terrorists, it is necessary to change perspectives. This 
change of perspective is the greatest benefit of the case study.  Although other 
methods of research may offer a glimpse, the red team members truly grew to 
understand the advantages and limitations of being a terrorist cell planning an 
attack while operating covertly in an alien city.  
                                            
6 Ray Buettner, Jr., Associate Professor of Information Sciences at NPS, briefed 
representatives from Seattle and San Francisco agencies in preparation for a conference on 
Transportation Structure Vulnerabilities on June 5, 2004, on the results of this Red Team Case 
Study.  Key officials from the City of Seattle, Port of Seattle, Washington State Department of 
Transportation, USCG, and City of San Francisco were present for the briefing.  
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VII.  CONCLUSIONS  
A. SUMMARY  
Red teaming will not prevent surprises.  Surprise is inherent in a 
world dominated by chance, ambiguity, and uncertainty.  But red 
teaming can prepare military organizations to deal with surprise.  In 
particular, it can create the mental framework that is prepared for 
the unexpected and it is the skillful, intelligent adaptation to the 
actual conditions of war that best leads to victory. (Murray, 2003)   
Although it is necessary to take precautions and research 
countermeasures, terrorists will find a different target or a different avenue to 
accomplish their objectives, so prioritization becomes critical to any type of 
defense.  However, by identifying vulnerabilities and hardening the security 
around the most desirous targets, nations can hinder the efforts of terrorists and 
deny them the opportunity to spread their message and achieve their objective. 
Furthermore, by examining the tools and tactics available to terrorists, it is 
possible to establish intelligence profiles and threat indicators to warn of potential 
attacks and other operations.   Red teaming can assist in all these efforts if done 
correctly in the right atmosphere, but it can also provide a fresh perspective to 
participants and recipients.   Therefore, were these military red teams effective in 
identifying maritime vulnerabilities to terrorist attack?  
The operational plans devised by the red teams in this case study 
definitely have the potential to further the primary objective of terrorists linked 
with Al Qa’ida, as stated in the available doctrine.  The communication and 
coordination schemes are already in use by covert terrorist cells across the 
globe.  Additionally, with so many cells worldwide, it is impossible to say that 
each cell uses only one method of communication.  Consequently, the 
communication and encryption schemes utilized by the red teams are not only 
consistent but also representational of the potential methods in use today.  In 
addition, terrorists have consistently used conventional explosives delivered in 
remarkable means.  The use of commercial cargo vessels as a means of delivery 
would be extremely more difficult to accomplish than the plane hijackings of 
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September 11, 2001.  However, if the captain or key crewmembers were 
sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause, it is plausible that other crewmembers would 
not be aware of their plans until minutes prior to the attack.  Therefore, each of 
the three operational plans might have achieved a high measure of success.  
The operations security and policy implementation vulnerabilities show the true 
measure of the effectiveness of the case study.  It is important to establish 
security measures and devise countermeasures, but poor implementation and 
improper release of information can offset the advantages of the security 
measures.   As a result, this case study was effective in evaluating the security 
environment surrounding these three coastal cities and identifying avenues of 
attack on these potential targets.   
“But because wargames are not mere abstract diversions, the game 
reviewer must also comment on its accuracy or ‘realism’”.  (Perla, 1990)  Three 
situational elements of the red team contribute to the realism of the case study – 
the composition and background of the red teams, the scenario, and the conduct 
of play.  Even though the red team members are better educated than the 
average terrorist, the terrorists selected to operate in foreign cultures are not the 
average. They are well educated in computer science, engineering, 
communication methods, languages, and operational planning.  The critical 
differences lie in the nationalities and religions of the red team members vice 
terrorists.  The visible differences in looks may account for the lack of reports of 
suspicious activity.7  The military bearing of the officers may have also 
contributed to the success of the individuals in social engineering information 
from workers and staff.  Yet, with the relaxed criteria for behavior of covert 
operatives and the online recruitment for Muslims of different heritages, it is 
conceivable that terrorists will no longer fit the former profile.  Religious ideology 
is the critical element that separates the red teams from real terrorist operatives – 
it is especially difficult for moderate believers to appreciate the fundamentalists’ 
conviction and their devotion to their leaders.  The seminar style for the conduct 
                                            
7 There were two women on the red teams, and all of the male officers have military haircuts 
and no beards. Additionally, none of the red team members are of Middle Eastern descent.  
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of play allowed the red teams to also function as control teams (white cells) and 
analyze the work of the other cells.  Although it may have detracted from the 
realism of the case study, this conduct of play allowed the red team members to 
discuss the potential tools and tactics at length and draw on the knowledge and 
expertise of the entire class as they devised their plans.  However, each red 
team invariably drew on their own knowledge for the final plan – relying on the 
most familiar and established tools and tactics available and learning from 
previous operations.  Ultimately, we believe that this aspect is also characteristic 
of the conduct of terrorists. Thus, although the individuals differed greatly from 
the terrorist profiles, the scenario and conduct of play allowed for these 
differences, providing a realistic effort with effective results.  
As previously discussed, the benefits of a manual free form exercise are 
qualitative and subjective to the reviewer.  “Critics have the responsibility not only 
to comment on whether a designer achieved his objectives, but also on whether 
these objectives are worth achieving.” (Perla, 1990)   We truly believe that the 
red teams achieved worthwhile objectives while allowing an examination of the 
concept itself.  This thesis was successful in assisting the national and regional 
efforts in the following respects:  
(1) Identification of potential vulnerabilities on desirous targets;  
(2) Evaluation of possible terrorist methods and means;  
(3) Examination of the decision-making process of terrorists and covert 
operatives;  
(4) Training of the red teams and other outside agencies in the terrorist 
perspective and ideology; 
(5) Identification of critical situational and organizational elements of the 
red team concept; and 
(6) Establishment of two approaches to measure the effectiveness of a red 
team exercise. 
Yet, it is important to remember that there are constraints on any war game: 
(Brewer & Shubik, 1979)  
(1) War games are abstractions of complex realities, and require 
augmentation with judgment, common sense, and the usual 
conventional research.  
(2) Consistency and relevancy depends on the skill and fortune of 
designers.  
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(3) The results depend on the skill of the players and the judgment of the 
controllers.  
(4) Experimental testing is required to establish appropriateness, 
effectiveness, utility and worth.  
This thesis has identified vital measures that require action to increase the 
effectiveness of the case study.  Moreover, additional research to complement 
and support the efforts of this thesis will improve the utilization of the red team 
concept in future endeavors.  
   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The key to security, domestic or otherwise, is the continuous evaluation of 
the security environment while mitigating the risk of the decisions made to 
counter threats.  By using the red team concept, enterprises can draw on the 
perspective of the adversary to challenge their assumptions and their 
countermeasures.  Likewise, more civilian enterprises should employ red teams 
to evaluate the implementation of their security plans and daily operations 
security.  Yet, the utilization of red teams requires careful consideration.   The 
enterprise must take into account the critical situational and organizational 
elements of the red team concept.  Specifically, we recommend the following 
steps in application of the red team concept:  
(1) Determine the objective(s) of the exercise, experiment, or activity at the 
outset, i.e. research, training, evaluation, etc.  
(2) Select the type of exercise, i.e. manual or machine, field or seminar, etc.  
(3) Establish the conduct of play of the exercise to include schedule, 
constraints, and assets 
(4) Determine the level of interaction between the blue, red, and white 
teams (friendly, adversary, and & control groups) or constructs for field 
evaluations 
(5) Establish means of analysis and measures of effectiveness of the 
exercise 
(6) Establish documentation methods and means 
(7) Develop the scenario, based on historical accounts and available 
doctrine 
(8) Staff the red team with imaginative, knowledgeable personnel 
(9) Train the red team in the available doctrine and ideology of the 
adversary 
(10) Conduct exercise  
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(11) Interpret results of exercise based on the established measures of 
effectiveness 
(12) Distribute the information as required 
(13) Evaluate the reception of the information, i.e. actions taken, etc.  
If properly employed, the red team concept can improve any system’s 
effectiveness.   
 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This thesis attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of the red team 
concept in the identification of maritime vulnerabilities to terrorist attack.  Yet, 
more remains for research about the application of the concept.  As the DSB 
recommended, a “best practices” guide is necessary to provide consistent use 
throughout the DOD.   Particularly, standards of documentation or training for 
scenario development would alleviate misinterpretation of results and enhance 
the realism of exercises, respectively.  The varied and complex usage of red 
teams will hinder the establishment of concrete methods, but these guidelines 
would assist those unfamiliar with the concept.  Furthermore, more research is 
required to utilize the results of this thesis completely.  Countermeasures, threat 
warning indicators, intelligence collection methods, and policy reviews are 
necessary to decrease these vulnerabilities to terrorist attack.  Finally, civilian 
agencies and regional planners especially need to research the benefits of the 
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